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SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY RESOLUTIONS 
Scott Hirst* 
Shareholders exert significant influence on the social and 
environmental behavior of U.S. corporations through their votes on 
social responsibility resolutions. However, the outcomes of many 
social responsibility resolutions are distorted, because the largest 
shareholders – institutional investors, such as mutual funds and 
pension funds – often do not follow the interests or the preferences 
of their own investors. This paper presents evidence that 
institutions with similar investors and identical fiduciary duties vote 
very differently on social responsibility resolutions, suggesting that 
some institutional votes distort the interests of their investors. Other 
evidence presented suggests that institutional votes on social 
responsibility resolutions vary significantly from the preferences of 
their own investors. Whether such distortion of preferences is a 
problem is an open question. If such distortion is considered to be a 
problem, it could be addressed by institutions changing their voting 
policies on social responsibility resolutions to better approximate the 
preferences of their investors. The stakes are high: eliminating 
distortion could significantly influence the behavior of corporations 
on social and environmental matters in a way that investors, and 
society, would prefer. 
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 Introduction 
Shareholders exert significant influence on the social and environmental 
behavior of U.S. corporations. Shareholders vote on social and 
environmental resolutions, which I refer to as ‘social responsibility 
resolutions,’ that are put forward at corporations. The success or failure of 
social responsibility resolutions influences the social and environmental 
behavior of those corporations. The largest shareholders are institutional 
investors – mutual funds, investment advisers and pension funds. When 
they vote on social responsibility resolutions, they do so as fiduciaries for 
their own investors. This article considers two questions: Do the votes of 
institutions on social responsibility resolutions follow the interests of their 
own investors? And do the votes of institutions on social responsibility 
resolutions follow the preferences of their own investors? The article puts 
forward evidence that they do not, and considers whether this is a problem, 
and how it could be addressed. The stakes are high: if institutional investors 
voted on social responsibility proposals as their own investors preferred, 
corporate behavior on social and environmental matters might be much 
closer to what investors, and society, would prefer. 
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Voting has long been recognized as one of the primary rights of 
shareholders.1 Shareholders vote to elect the board of directors of the 
corporation, as well as on fundamental corporate transactions and changes 
to the corporate charter.2 Shareholders can also vote on precatory 
resolutions put forward by other shareholders, including those included in 
the corporation’s proxy statement by shareholder proposals, as required by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission.3 This article focuses on social 
responsibility resolutions, those requesting that corporations take certain 
actions on social and environmental matters. 
If a sole investor or a small group of investors held shares in a 
corporation directly, they could coordinate and vote to cause the board of 
directors to act in their preferred manner. However, the number of investors 
in U.S. public corporations is very large, making coordinated action 
difficult. Some of these investors own shares in corporations directly, but 
the overwhelming majority invest through institutional investors – mutual 
funds, investment advisers and pension funds. Each of these institutions 
invests in corporations as a fiduciary on behalf of these investors. Because 
these investors invest through intermediaries that make voting decisions on 
their behalves, there is a possibility that the voting decisions may not reflect 
their interests, or their preferences. In examining this issue, this article 
focuses on voting by mutual funds, not only because mutual funds hold the 
largest proportion of equity of U.S. corporations, but also because they are 
the only type of institution for which voting data is widely available. The 
                                                                                                                                          
1 See, e.g., Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del.Ch.1988) (“The 
shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of 
directorial power rests.”); Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1381 (Del. 1996) 
(“[T]he stockholders control their own destiny through informed voting. This is 
the highest and best form of corporate democracy.”) 
2 For a discussion of shareholder voting on charter amendments, see Scott Hirst, 
Frozen Charters, 34 Yale J. Reg. (2017), forthcoming; Harvard Law School 
Program on Corporate Governance Working Paper 2016-01, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2729699. 
3 See Rule 14a-8 “Shareholder Proposals,” promulgated pursuant to the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8. Shareholder proposals 
submitted pursuant to Rule 14a-8 contain “recommendation or requirement that 
the company and/or its board of directors take action” (ibid.). These 
recommendations or requirements are presented as resolutions that shareholders 
vote upon at the corporation’s meeting. The terms ‘proposal’ and ‘resolution’ are 
often used interchangably; I will generally use the term ‘resolution.’ 
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fiduciary duties of mutual fund directors and investment advisers are 
generally interpreted as requiring them to vote on resolutions at portfolio 
corporations, in the best interests of their investors.4 
A consideration of the voting records of mutual funds suggests that the 
way some mutual funds vote on social responsibility resolutions may 
represent a distortion of either the interests or the preferences of their 
investors. First, votes of different mutual funds on social responsibility 
resolutions diverge widely, even among mutual funds that are likely to have 
very similar investors with very similar interests. If there is a way to vote on 
these resolutions that reflects the best interests of these investors, some 
mutuals funds appear to be voting wrongly on many resolutions. Second, 
this article provides evidence that the way that many mutual funds vote on 
resolutions may differ from the views of a majority of their own investors. 
Because funds vote ‘all-or-nothing’ for, against or abstain, even where funds 
vote the way a majority of their investors are likely to prefer, there will be a 
divergence from the preferences of a minority of their investors. 
Even if this is the case, does it matter that mutual fund votes may not 
follow the preferences of their investors? This is open to debate. If mutual 
funds can determine better than their own investors what is in the interests 
of those investors, then this distortion may be optimal. Alternatively, if 
corporations can determine for themselves the actions that will maximize 
value on the matters being considered, then the preferences of investors 
may be irrelevant. However, if it is considered valuable for corporations to 
follow the wishes of their investors, then these distortions may represent a 
significant problem, as they result in corporations being less likely to act as 
their ultimate investors would prefer. Many resolutions requesting action 
on environmental and social matters may fail where investors would prefer 
that they pass. Corporations are less likely to take requested actions where 
resolutions fail. And proponents are less likely to bring resolutions at other 
                                                                                                                                          
4 See, e.g., Letter from Alan D. Lebowitz, Deputy Assistant Secretary, 
Department of Labor, to Robert Monks, Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc., 
January 23, 1990 at 3 (reprinted at 17 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 244) (“The fiduciary 
act of managing plan assets that are shares of corporate stock includes the voting 
of proxies appurtenant to those shares of stock.”) While this opinion only applies 
to investment advisers to ERISA pension plans, since these are the same advisers 
that advise mutual funds its effect has been that investment advisers to mutual 
funds routinely vote the shares of those mutual funds. 
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corporations, or bring other kinds of resolutions, given that such resolutions 
attract less support than they otherwise would. Public officials that consider 
the results of resolutions as a proxy for investor preferences on these 
matters will receive distorted information, and may be less likely to take 
action themselves. 
This article does not attempt to offer a conclusion regarding whether 
distortion constitutes a problem, or even whether it is taking place. 
However, in the event that distortion is taking place and is considered a 
problem, the article considers the alternatives for resolving the problem. 
One possible solution is for investors to choose mutual funds that vote in 
the ways that they prefer. This already takes place to limited extent when 
investors invest in ‘socially responsible investment’ (SRI) funds. However, 
SRI funds represent a small percentage of aggregate funds invested, and 
there are significant impediments to widespread sorting among mutual 
funds, including very limited investor access to the information necessary 
to make such decisions. The alternative is for mutual funds to consider the 
preferences of their investors when determining voting policies and 
decisions. In order to represent investors with preferences representing a 
minority of investment in the fund as well as those representing a majority, 
mutual funds could adopt policies whereby they would split their vote in 
proportions consistent with the preferences of their investors. Vote splitting 
is currently rare, but as a practical matter it is likely to be relatively 
straightforward for these well-resourced institutions. 
The next step in this debate should be for further consideration of the 
preferences of investors. The data used in this article to draw conclusions 
about investor preferences is limited and imperfect; the investment industry 
– with the encouragement of the Securities and Exchange Commission – 
should undertake their own analysis to determine whether their voting 
differs from how their investors would prefer, and whether this represents 
a problem.  
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Part I describes 
the background to shareholder voting on social responsibility resolutions. 
Section A considers the composition of ‘shareholders,’ and describes how 
they are predominantly institutional investors – mutual funds, investment 
managers and pension funds – that invest on behalf of U.S. households, the 
ultimate investors in U.S. corporations. Section B considers shareholder 
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voting, including the rules that apply to mutual fund voting, and the 
resolutions that are voted on by shareholders. Part II provides empirical 
evidence of mutual fund voting on social responsibility resolutions. Section 
B highlights the divergence of voting among mutual funds, and the potential 
issues this raises. Section C considers evidence of likely investor preferences 
to draw conclusions about how mutual fund votes may not represent the 
preferences of their investors, and Section D considers arguments whether 
or not this distortion constitutes a problem. If distortion is considered to be 
a problem, Part III examines two alternatives approaches for undistorting 
shareholder voting, and explains how this may have a significant impact on 
the social and environmental behavior of U.S. corporations. 
I. Shareholder Voting & 
Social Responsibility Resolutions 
A. Shareholders 
Although some proportion of the equity of public corporations is owned 
by individuals and households directly or through brokers, the significant 
majority of equity of most corporations is beneficially owned by institutional 
investors – mutual funds, investment advisers and pension funds. Each of 
these institutions are fiduciaries for their own beneficiaries. According to 
the U.S. Federal Reserve’s quarterly accounts as of the end of 2014, of 
approximately $29.8 trillion in equity of U.S. corporations, 35% was owned 
directly by households and non-profit organizations; 14% was owned by 
pension funds (split approximately equally between public and private 
pension funds); 24% was held by mutual funds, 6% by insurance companies, 
and 20% was held by foreign investors.5 
                                                                                                                                          
5 See Federal Reserve, Account L.213 Corporate Equities, Z.1 Flow of Funds 
memorandum, March 12, 2015, at 119. The remainder was held by other financial 
institutions, and government (excluding public pension funds). Because the value 
for households is calculated as the residual left after other owners of corporate 
equity are determined, and because the Federal Reserve’s accounting is 
insufficiently granular to pick up certain kinds of institutional investors – e.g., 
hedge funds – these numbers likely understate the ownership of corporate equity 
by institutions. See Federal Reserve Bank, Description of Table L.101 - Households 
and Nonprofit Organizations, available at https://perma.cc/BAX2-RDZG. 
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The beneficiaries of institutional investors are U.S. households. In the 
case of defined benefit pension plans, they are past and future retirees. In 
the case of mutual funds and investment advisers, although a significant 
proportion – 25% of mutual funds and investment advisers6 – is held by 
public pension funds, the majority is held by individuals who purchase 
directly (‘retail’ investors) or through individual retirement accounts 
(IRAs), and many more that purchase through their defined contribution 
plans, often referred to as ‘401(k)’ plans.7 
This article focuses on voting by mutual funds, because mutual funds 
own the largest proportion of U.S. equity, and because – as discussed below 
– mutual funds are the only type of institution generally required to disclose 
their votes. The structure of mutual fund holdings, through shares or units, 
also makes it easy to identify the proportion of the fund that is held for 
particular beneficiaries. It is not possible to do the same for beneficiaries of 
defined benefit plans, which contain a mix of vested interests for employees 
that have retired, and unvested interests for employees that have not yet 
retired, the value of which cannot be ascertained. However, similar issues 
of distortion of beneficiary preferences as discussed below are likely to arise 
for defined contribution plans as well, and similar arguments could be 
applied. 
B. Shareholder Voting 
As the beneficial owners of shares in corporations, mutual funds 
generally have the right to direct the votes8 associated with those shares on 
                                                                                                                                          
6 Calculated from Federal Reserve, Account L.214 Mutual Fund Shares, Z.1 
Flow of Funds memorandum, March 12, 2015, at 119. 
7 See Section 401(k) of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.), 26 U.S. Code § 
401(k). 401(k) plans are defined contribution plans sponsored by corporations. 
Similar defined contribution plans administered by tax-exempt organizations, are 
governed by Section 403(b) of the I.R.C., 26 U.S. Code § 401(k). Defined 
contribution plans sponsored by federal or state government are generally 
governed by separate legislation – e.g., the Thrift Saving Plan for employees of the 
U.S. Federal Government, or the New York State Voluntary Defined Contribution 
Plan. 
8 Technically, the right to vote associated with shares is held by the registered 
owner of shares. The shares beneficially owned by institutional investors such as 
mutual funds are held by custodians, which in turn hold the shares through a 
clearing organization, the Depository Trust Corporation (DTC), which is the legal 
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the matters that are put to a vote at those corporations. Each mutual fund is 
organized as a corporation (predominantly in Maryland), or a trust 
(predominantly Massachusetts business trusts or Delaware statutory 
trusts).9 Directors or trustees have the responsibility to vote, but delegate 
this responsibility – along with the management of the mutual fund – to 
investment advisers, each of which advises many different mutual funds. 
Although directors formally appoint the investment adviser, mutual funds 
are generally established and organized by investment advisers, which not 
only operate the funds, but also use the investment adviser’s name in the 
naming and marketing of the fund. Each investment adviser generally 
advises dozens or hundreds of funds. The group of funds advised by an 
investment adviser is often referred to as a ‘fund complex’ or ‘fund family.’ 
Mutual funds are required to publicly disclose the policies and 
procedures by which they determine how to vote the shares owned by the 
mutual fund,10 and to publicly disclose how the fund voted on each 
resolution that was put to a vote at companies in which it owned shares, in 
an SEC filing on Form N-PX.11  Investment advisers are also required to 
disclose their proxy voting policies, and maintain records of their proxy 
                                                                                                                                          
owner of shares in the corporation, and therefore exercises the legal right to vote. 
The DTC does this by submitting an omnibus proxy, which aggregates voting 
directions that it has received from custodians, which in turn received instructions 
from the mutual funds and other institutions that beneficially own the shares held 
by the custodian. For a comprehensive discussion of this process, see Marcel Kahan 
& Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 Geo. L. J. (2008) 
1227, 1243-1249. 
9 Although the fiduciary duties of trustees under common law generally vary 
significantly from those of directors, the Massachusetts and Delaware statutes 
under which these trusts are established recognize that trustees of those trustees 
owe duties akin to directors, rather than akin to trustees in general law. For the 
position in Delaware, see Saminksy v Abbott, 40 Del. Ch. 528 (1961). For 
Massachusetts, see the decision of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 
Halebian v Berv, 457 Mass. 620 (2010). For parsimony, this article will refer to 
‘directors’ of mutual funds, but the arguments made apply equally to mutual funds 
organized as trusts that therefore have trustees rather than directors. 
10 See Form N-1A prescribed under the Investment Company Act of 1940 
(henceforth, the ‘1940 Act’), 17 C.F.R. 270.30b1-4 (requiring the disclosure of 
proxy voting policies by mutual funds). 
11 See Rule 30b1-4 of the 1940 Act Rules, 17 C.F.R. 270.30b1-4 (requiring the 
disclosure of proxy voting records on Form N-PX). 
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voting.12 Larger investment advisers have dedicated corporate governance 
staff, who are responsible for the preparation and implementation of voting 
policies. Smaller investment advisers may delegate the task of voting 
according to each fund’s voting policies to an outside consultant or proxy 
advisor. In each case, voting policies are approved by the board of directors 
of the fund. 
C. Social Responsibility Resolutions 
The matters that mutual funds vote on – and therefore, the matters 
covered by these policies – encompass all of the matters put to a vote at 
public corporations: the election of directors, fundamental corporate 
changes such as mergers, changes to the corporation’s charter, and 
resolutions put forward by the directors or shareholders of the corporation. 
Resolutions put forward by shareholders include social responsibility 
resolutions – those related to environmental and social matters – as well as 
governance matters. This article focuses on social responsibility resolutions, 
as mutual fund voting on these matters is more likely to diverge from the 
preferences of individual investors than voting on elections, mergers or 
governance matters. Voting for directors and voting on mergers requires 
considerable information about the company, its prospects and 
management, which ultimate investors – households – are unlikely to have 
knowledge of. Similarly, households are unlikely to have in-depth 
knowledge about governance matters voted on a corporations, such as 
whether the corporation’s compensation arrangements are value 
enhancing, or whether the corporation should have a classified board or 
annual elections. In contrast, the most common social responsibility 
resolutions relate to political contributions and lobbying disclosure, 
greenhouse gas emissions, climate change and sustainability. These are 
topics that are part of the popular discourse, on which individual investors 
are likely to have their own preferences, and their own views regarding 
whether or not actions on these matters are likely to increase value. Table 1, 
                                                                                                                                          
12 See Rule 204-2 of the Rules and Regulations promulgated pursuant to the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (henceforth, the ‘Advisers Act’), 17 C.F.R. 
275.204-2 (requiring investment advisers to maintain proxy voting policies and 
records). See also Rule 206(4)-6 of the Advisers Act Rules, 17 C.F.R. 275.206(4)-6 
(exercising voting authority is a fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act unless 
voting policies are formulated and disclosed to clients). 
Social Responsibility Resolutions 
9 
below, lists the most common types of social responsibility resolutions voted 
on at annual meetings in 2014 (excluding categories with less than five 
resolutions voted on), the number of resolutions voted on for each category, 
and the average votes cast in favor of those resolutions as a percentage of 
votes cast.13 
Table 1: Results for Most Common Social Responsibility Resolutions, 2014 
 Type of Resolution 
Resolutions Percentage of votes cast 












Political Contributions Disclosure 45 1 26% 61% 12% 
Political Lobbying Disclosure 38 0 23% 66% 11% 
Political Activities and Action 12 0 7% 88%  5% 
Human Rights Risk Assessment  9 0 22% 66% 12% 
Sexual Orientation Anti-bias Policy   6 0 35% 59%  6% 

















Green House Gas Emissions 20 0 21% 66% 13% 
Report on Sustainability  13 0 25% 63% 13% 
Climate Change  9 0 19% 68% 12% 
Recycling   6 0 18% 74%  9% 
Genetically Modified Organisms  6 0 5% 84% 11% 
 
Table 1 shows that, of the most common social responsibility resolutions 
in 2014, only one resolution passed,14 and that social responsibility 
                                                                                                                                          
13 Data is derived from ISS’s Voting Analytics database. Note that there are 
significantly more shareholder resolutions submitted than voted upon.  If Rule 14a-
8 permits, certain resolutions may be omitted from proxy statements. A 
corporation receiving a resolution may also reach agreement with the proponent to 
withdraw the resolution. However, it can be difficult to find accurate figures for the 
number of resolutions submitted. Requests for permission to exclude resolutions 
are public. However, neither companies nor proponents are required to disclose 
the number of resolutions that are withdrawn by agreement with corporations. As 
a matter of practice, many of the organizations submitting such resolutions disclose 
their resolutions, and these are collected by the organization As You Sow, but these 
are likely to underestimate the true number of resolutions submitted. 
14 That resolution was a resolution requesting that Smith & Wesson Holding 
Corporation disclose its political contribution and lobbying expenditure. It 
received 49.7% of votes cast, but 55.8% of the for/against votes, the standard on 
which the company determines shareholder resolution success. 
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resolutions receive relatively low levels of shareholder support,15 with the 
most successful category receiving average support of 35% of votes cast. 
The social responsibility resolution most frequently voted on in 2014 
requested the disclosure of political contributions by the corporation. The 
most common version of this type of resolution was based on a template 
promulgated by the Center for Political Accountability, which takes the 
following form: 
Resolved, that the shareholders of [Company] 
hereby request that the Company provide a report, 
updated semi-annually, disclosing the Company’s: 
1. Policies and procedures for making, with 
corporate funds or assets, contributions and 
expenditures (direct or indirect) to (a) participate 
or intervene in any political campaign on behalf of 
(or in opposition to) any candidate for public office, 
or (b) influence the general public, or any segment 
thereof, with respect to an election or referendum. 
2. Monetary and non-monetary contributions and 
expenditures (direct and indirect) used in the 
manner described in section 1 above, including: 
a. The identity of the recipient as well as the 
amount paid to each; and 
b. The title(s) of the person(s) in the Company 
responsible for decision-making. 
The report shall be presented to the board of 
directors or relevant board committee and posted 
on the Company’s website.16 
                                                                                                                                          
15 The low rates of success in the resolutions that are voted on are likely to reflect 
some level of selection bias. If a company believes a resolution is likely to pass, or 
even to receive significant support, the company may reach an agreement with the 
proponent to undertake all or some of the measures that the resolution requests, in 
return for the proponent withdrawing the resolution. 
16 See Center for Political Accountability, Political Disclosure and Oversight 
Resolution 2013, available at http://perma.cc/AN8W-FYTA.   
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Part II uses resolutions requesting disclosure of political contributions 
like this one to consider how mutual fund votes may distort investor 
interests and preferences. 
II. Distortions in Social Responsibility 
Resolutions 
A. Voting on Social Responsibility Resolutions 
How do mutual funds actually vote on resolutions requesting disclosure 
of political spending? To consider this question, this section presents voting 
data drawn from ISS’s Voting Analytics database, which is based on the data 
released by mutual funds on Form N-PX, and includes data on 746 
shareholder resolutions voted on at 326 companies at annual meetings 
between July 1, 2013 and June 30, 2014. For those resolutions, the database 
contains votes by 4,003 mutual funds in 236 fund families, with 295,441 total 
fund-votes. 
I assemble voting data on resolutions requesting disclosure of political 
spending, and for comparison, those relating to greenhouse gas emissions, 
the most frequently submitted environmental resolution in Table 1. For each 
fund family with more than 10 votes on a particular resolution I determine 
the proportion of the fund-votes in that family that were for, against and 
abstain. 
For each mutual fund family, I present the percentage of fund-votes in 
favor, against and abstain on each type of resolution. Almost all funds in the 
sample voted ‘all-or-nothing’ on each resolution17 – that is, the fund voted 
all of its shares the same way on the resolution, either for, against, or abstain. 
To illustrate, a 30% ‘for’ result for a fund family with 50 mutual funds that 
voted on 20 resolutions of a particular type could mean that, of the fund 
family’s 1,000 total fund-votes, 30 of the funds in the family voted all of 
                                                                                                                                          
17 Of the 295,411 fund-votes in the data set, there were only 106 split votes 
(0.04%), from 12 fund families, notably from JPMorgan Asset Management, which 
split 33 fund-votes, Leader Capital 19, John Hancock 16, and Wilshire Associates 
14. The voting policy of JPMorgan Asset Management suggests that it likely split 
votes because one or more of the funds’ portfolio managers had a different opinion 
on the resolution’s value than the fund’s overall voting decision. 
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their shares in 10 companies in favor of the resolution, or all 50 of the funds 
in the family voted all their shares in 6 companies in favor of the resolution. 
Figure 1, below, presents data for votes by the largest 30 fund families18 
on political spending disclosure resolutions, in decreasing order of the 
percentage of fund-votes in favor. Funds with less than 100 fund-votes are 
excluded. Black denotes the proportion of fund-votes in favor, gray the 
proportion against, and white the proportion of fund-votes to abstain. The 
data are also presented in tabular form in Table A.1 in the Appendix, 
together with the corresponding data ranked by fund family size. 
Figure 1: Largest Mutual Fund Family Voting on Resolutions regarding 
Political Spending Disclosure 
 
The funds in Figure 1 voted, on average 27.6% ‘for’ and 55.4% ‘against’ 
(weighted by the number of fund votes in the family). For comparison 
purposes, Figure 2, below, present corresponding results for resolutions 
regarding greenhouse gas emissions disclosure (the corresponding averages 
are 27.2% ‘for’ and 58.6% ‘against’). 
                                                                                                                                          
18 The largest funds are determined by the total net assets of the fund, derived 
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Figure 2: Largest Mutual Fund Family Voting on Resolutions regarding 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Disclosure 
 
 
B. Heterogeneity in Voting on Social Responsibility Resolutions 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show that different fund families vote very 
differently from one another on particular types of resolutions.19 For 
example, on resolutions to disclose political spending, Deutsche Asset 
Management voted 100% of its fund-votes in favor of such resolutions. Yet 
Dreyfus, Putnam and Dimensional voted 100% of their fund-votes against 
such resolutions. If there was likely to be significant variation in the 
investors served by these different fund families, the variation might be 
explained by the fund following the preferences of their investors. For 
instance, if one of the institutions were a socially responsible investment 
fund, it might attract particularly socially-minded investors, whose 
preferences may differ from those mainstream mutual fund investors, which 
might explain the different voting results. However, all of the funds included 
in Figure 1 and Figure 2 are all very large, mainstream mutual funds. Given 
the size and number of investors in these mutual funds, the comparability of 
their mutual fund offerings, and the robust competition in the mutual fund 
                                                                                                                                          
19 This is consistent with empirical evidence on mutual fund voting in director 
elections. See, e.g., Gregor Matvos & Michael Ostrovsky, Heterogeneity and peer 
effects in mutual fund proxy voting, (2010) 98 J. Fin. Econ 90, 90 (“[M]utual 
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market,20 it is likely that there is a significant overlap between the types of 
investors these funds cover. It is therefore likely that the views of ultimate 
investors in the funds in Figure 1 and Figure 2 do not vary significantly from 
one fund to another. As a result, the preferences of the ultimate investors in 
these funds are unlikely to vary as much as the variation in the votes among 
the funds.  Funds that vote in radically different ways cannot all be right 
about which vote would maximize shareholder value. And if those funds 
have shareholders with similar preferences, at least some of the funds must 
be voting in ways that do not match the preferences of their investors. 
How can mutual funds vote so differently? Mutual funds directors, who 
are ultimately responsible for fund voting, have a fiduciary duty to act in the 
best interest of the mutual fund. Investment advisers, which advise on and 
carry out fund votes, have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of their 
client, the mutual fund. The content of these duties is the same for all 
mutual funds: to maximize the value of the fund, which means maximizing 
the value of the portfolio companies that are subject to these resolutions. If 
these fiduciaries have the same imperative, how can they vote for opposite 
outcomes? 
The only way to reconcile these conflicting actions is that different 
mutual funds have different beliefs about the actions that are most likely to 
increase the value of the company. This is possible because of the limited 
evidence about the effects of different environmental and social actions by 
corporations on value. For instance, consider the evidence regarding 
disclosure of political contributions. Although there is a substantial 
literature spread across a number of disciplines about corporate political 
activity by corporations,21 only a small part of this deals with the value 
                                                                                                                                          
20 See John C. Coates IV & R. Glenn Hubbard, Competition in the Mutual Fund 
Industry: Evidence and Implications for Policy, 33 J. Corp. L. 151, 153 (2007) 
(“[P]rice competition is in fact a strong force constraining fund advisers”). 
21 A number of review articles describe the extensive empirical literature on 
corporate political activity, which includes political contributions, political 
spending, lobbying, and political networks, and which also consider the effects of 
corporate political activity on value. These include Brian Schaffer, Firm-level 
Responses to Government Regulation: Theoretical and Research Approaches, (1995) 21 
J. Mgmt. 495; Amy Hillman, Gerald Keim & Douglas Schuler, Corporate Political 
Activity: A Review and Research Agenda, (2004) 30 J. Mgmt. 837; and Ike Mathur 
& Manohar Singh, Corporate Political Strategies, (2011) 51 Acc. & Fin. 252. In 
addition to these narrative reviews, Lux, Crook & Woehr conduct a meta-analysis 
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effects of political contributions. Key parts of this question are under-
explored, and the empirical evidence that has been produced provides 
conflicting evidence of whether political spending increases or decreases 
corporate value, and for which corporations and under what circumstances 
it does so. This empirical evidence relating to the value effects of political 
spending relates to spending that has been disclosed; the evidence on 
whether disclosure of political spending increases or decreases corporate 
value is very limited.22 
Despite this paucity of evidence, mutual fund directors and investment 
advisers are nonetheless forced to make decisions about which outcome on 
each issue is most likely to maximize the value of the corporation. So it 
should be no surprise that they make decisions based on factors other than 
the evidence, and that those factors, and the consequent decisions, vary 
widely. In some cases, there may be interests other than those of their clients 
that could affect investment adviser decision making. Others have 
suggested that mutual funds may have incentives to not to vote against the 
preferences of managers of corporations, in order to improve their chances 
of receiving plan administration business from those corporations.23 
Investment advisers that are public companies may themselves be subject to 
potential shareholder pressure on the same matters that they are voting on 
                                                                                                                                          
of the evidence Sean Lux, T. Russell Crook & David Woehr, Mixing Business with 
Politics: A Meta-Analysis of the Antecedents and Outcomes of Corporate Political 
Activity, (2011) 37 J. Mgmt. 223, which concludes that corporate political activity 
does increase corporate value. 
22 For a recent paper considering the value effects of disclosure, see Saumya 
Prabhat & David Primo, Risky Business: Does Disclosure and Shareholder 
Approval of Corporate Political Contributions Affect Stock Volatility and Value?, 
Unpublished working paper (Apr. 2016), available at https://perma.cc/5P5J-
YMK8. 
23 See, e.g., Jennifer S. Taub, Able But Not Willing: The Failure of Mutual Fund 
Advisers to Advocate for Shareholder Rights, (2008-2009) 34 J. Corp. L. 843, 
846(“the greater the dependency of the [a]dviser upon the [defined contribution] 
channel for asset management business, the less likely the fund family will be to 
support shareholder-sponsored governance resolutions”); Rasha Ashraf, 
Narayanan Jayaraman, and Harley E. Ryan, Jr., Do Pension-Related Business Ties 
Influence Mutual Fund Proxy Voting? Evidence from Shareholder Proposals  on 
Executive Compensation, (2012) 47 J. Fin. & Quant. Analysis 567, 567 
(“Overall, our results suggest that pension-related business ties influence fund 
families to vote with management at all firms.”). 
Social Responsibility Resolutions 
16 
at their portfolio companies;24 voting in favor of change at a portfolio 
company might invite suggestions that the investment adviser itself make 
such a change. 
C. Distortions in Social Responsibility Resolutions 
How do mutual fund votes compare to the views of their own investors 
on the issues they vote on? No public data exists showing the preferences of 
the investors in particular mutual funds. However, since the ultimate 
investors in mutual funds are U.S. households, and the largest mutual funds 
represent millions of investors, the preferences of the investors in these 
funds are likely to approach the preferences of American households more 
generally. Mutual fund ownership is skewed towards wealthier and higher 
income members of society.25 However, a rough sense of the preferences of 
investors in mutual funds can be still gained by considering opinion polls of 
the general population. 
In an opinion poll conducted by Bannon Communications on behalf of 
the Corporate Reform Coalition in October 2012, 72% of respondents 
favored or strongly favored a resolution that “shareholders in a company 
approve all political spending before the money is spent,” an   even stronger 
position than requiring disclosure of political spending. 77% of respondents 
favored or strongly favored a resolution that required corporations to 
“publicly disclose political expenditures to other groups that spend money 
on politics like the Chamber of Commerce.”26 The results, extracted in 
Table A.2 of the Appendix, showed small and inconsistent variations among 
the groups of respondents younger than 35, between 35 and 55, and older 
than 55. 
                                                                                                                                          
24 For instance, in 2016 shareholders of T. Rowe Price Group Inc. and Franklin 
Resources, Inc. put forward shareholder resolutions requesting reports on climate 
change. See T. Rowe Price Group, Inc. Proxy Statement on Form 14A, filed Mar. 
18, 2016, 50; Franklin Resources, Inc. Proxy Statement on Form 14A, filed Jan. 8, 
2016, at 53. 
25 See, e.g., Eric N. Wolff, Who Owns Stock in American Corporations, 158(4) 
Proc. Am. Phil. Soc. (2014) 372, 387. 
26 The poll interviewed a randomly sample of 804 Americans aged 18 and over, 
and had an estimated margin of error of 3.8%. See Bannon Communications 
Research, Memo to Corporate Reform Coalition, Executive Summary, available at 
http://perma.cc/57VS-6JMR. Additional detail on the survey is available at 
http://perma.cc/BAJ8-4ZA2.   
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Additional light is shed on the robustness of the results across different 
groups by a poll conducted by SurveyUSA on behalf of People for the 
American Way, in February 2010.27 One of the questions in the poll asked 
“Should a publicly traded corporation get shareholder approval before the 
corporation spends money to support or oppose a candidate for elected 
office? Or, is shareholder approval not necessary?” 75% of respondents 
responded that corporations should get shareholder approval, compared to 
13% responding that approval was not necessary. Respondents aged 50 and 
over were more likely to respond that approval was necessary than those 
aged 18 to 49. Similarly, respondents with annual income over $50,000 were 
more likely to respond that approval was necessary than those with annual 
income less than $50,000. These results are extracted in Table A.3 of the 
Appendix. 
Obviously, these are imperfect estimates of the views of mutual fund 
investors, for a multitude of reasons: the polls were not restricted to mutual 
fund investors; there was no weighting by the number of mutual fund units 
or shares owned; results were likely to be influenced by the framing and 
wording of the questions posed (for instance, the questions did not mention 
the potential cost of implementing the resolutions); and the polls were 
commissioned by progressive organizations seeking to limit corporate 
political activity. To further this debate, methodologically superior polling 
of mutual fund investors should be conducted. The results of such polling 
are likely to differ from those presented here. However, in the absence of 
any other evidence, I will use these numbers to illustrate the ways in which 
investor preferences can be distorted. 
While some of the opinion poll questions asked about approval rather 
than disclosure of political spending,28 I will assume – based on those poll 
                                                                                                                                          
27 Survey conducted by SurveyUSA for People for the American Way, February 
10, 2010, available at http://perma.cc/YPB9-QAFL. 1,200 American adults were 
interviewed for the poll. The poll had a margin of error of 2.5%.   
28 One of the questions in the Bannon Communications poll did ask about policies 
requiring disclosure of political contributions to groups that spend money on 
politics. The other question referred to in the Bannon Communications poll, and 
the question referred to in the SurveyUSA poll, referred to policies requiring prior 
approval for political spending, which are even more stringent (and therefore likely 
to be less popular) than disclosure rules. The Bannon Communications numbers 
were relatively consistent between the two questions, with greater support for the 
disclosure resolution.   
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results described above – that about 70% of mutual fund investors, weighted 
by the value of their holdings, would be in favor of disclosure of political 
spending by corporations. Comparing this assumption to the actual mutual 
fund votes on political spending resolutions described in Figure 1 suggests 
that most large mutual funds are likely voting against the preferences of a 
majority of their investors on most resolutions of this nature. As discussed 
above, Dreyfus, Putnam and Dimensional voted all of their shares against 
every resolution requesting disclosure of political spending in 2014. In each 
case, if 70% of the fund’s investors were in favor of the resolution, there was 
a negative distortion of 70% from the vote in favor of the resolution that the 
fund investors would have preferred. 
Because mutual funds vote all of their shares in favor, against or abstain 
on resolutions, even when funds vote in the way that a majority of their 
investors would prefer, some distortion is inevitable. For instance, 
Deutsche Asset Management voted 100% of their shares in favor of almost 
all political spending disclosure resolutions. If only 70% of the fund’s 
investors would have preferred that the fund vote in favor, and 30% would 
have preferred that the fund vote against, then there was a positive 
distortion of 30% in the vote in favor of each resolution, and a negative 
distortion of 30% in the vote against each resolution. This distortion against 
the preferences of the minority of investors is inevitable if funds vote all-or-
nothing: there will always be some proportion of fund investors that disagree 
with the fund’s vote, and whose preferences are distorted through the 
mutual fund’s voting.29 
D. Should Fiduciaries Consider Investor Preferences? 
Whether fiduciaries, such as those directing and advising mutual funds, 
should consider the preferences of their investors is open to debate. This 
can be seen as an application of one of the most central and longest-running 
arguments in corporate law, regarding whether directors should act in what 
they think are the best interests of shareholders, or what shareholders think 
                                                                                                                                          
29 This assumes away the vanishingly unlikely possibility that all of a fund 
family’s very large number of investors are unanimously in favor or against a 
resolution.  
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are in the best interests of shareholders.30 The aim of this article is not to 
reach a conclusion on this question, but rather to put forward some 
considerations about the question as it applies to shareholder resolutions, 
and mutual fund voting on those resolutions. 
Although fiduciary duties require mutual fund directors and investment 
advisers to maximize the value of the fund, these duties are unlikely to 
prevent mutual fund managers from considering investor preferences 
except in the most extreme cases. To the extent investors prefer certain 
actions because they believe that those actions will maximize the value of 
the fund assets, or reduce the risk of an investment or the portfolio as a 
whole, those actions could obviously be considered.31 Questions of whether 
a fund manager can implement preferences that are likely to have no 
material effect on fund value, or to reduce fund value, are much more 
difficult.  
Whether mutual funds should consider their investors’ preferences may 
depend on the view taken of mutual fund managers, and of the managers of 
their portfolio companies.  If fund managers understand the likely effect of 
certain actions on fund value much better than their investors, then 
disregarding investors’ preferences will be in investors’ best interests. 
Similarly, if managers of portfolio companies understand the likely effect of 
corporate actions on the value of the corporation better than their 
shareholders (including mutual funds), then for them to disregard precatory 
resolutions will maximize firm value, and whether or not fund managers 
consider their investors’ preferences in voting on those resolutions will be 
irrelevant. 
The existence of shareholder resolutions, and the fact that successful 
shareholder resolutions influence the actions of directors, have implications 
for this debate.  If investor preferences were irrelevant, then the shareholder 
resolution process, the sole aim of which is to express the preferences of 
                                                                                                                                          
30 I am grateful to Ryan Bubb for discussions on this subject, and on some of the 
ideas underlying this section more generally. 
31 See, e.g., Department of Labor, Background to Interpretive Bulletin 2015-01, 
29 C.F.R. 2509.2015-01, Fed. Reg. 65,135 (Oct. 26, 2015)(“Fiduciaries need not 
treat commercially reasonable investments as inherently suspect or in need of 
special scrutiny merely because they take into consideration environmental, social, 
or other such factors.”) This applies only to fiduciaries and advisers for pension 
plans, but demonstrates that such factors can clearly be considered by fiduciaries. 
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shareholders for certain corporate actions, would also be irrelevant. 
However, successful shareholder resolutions clearly have an impact on 
corporate actions,32 suggesting that directors – who are fiduciaries for 
shareholders – do believe that the preferences of those shareholders are 
important. 
That shareholder resolutions are implemented by directors also 
highlights a flaw in the idea that directors always fulfil their fiduciary duty 
to act in the best interests of the company. Consider a company where 
directors always and only act in the best interests of the corporation, and 
where a shareholder resolution to disclose political spending is being voted 
on by shareholders. If directors believed that the measure was in the best 
interests of the company they would have implemented it when they first 
became aware of the possibility of such action – even if, for some reason, 
they had not been previously aware of it, at the latest, when the shareholder 
resolution was first put forward, obviating the need for a vote of 
shareholders. Under this view, that the resolution goes to a vote means that 
directors do not believe it is in the best interests of the corporation. 
Therefore, even if it receives majority support, directors should not 
implement it, as doing so would not be in the best interests of the 
corporation.  
A more direct version of this argument is the fact that mutual funds vote 
on shareholder resolutions at portfolio companies, and express their 
disapproval when directors do not respond to shareholder resolutions by 
withholding votes from those directors’ own elections. These facts suggest 
                                                                                                                                          
32 See, e.g., Randall S. Thomas & James F. Cotter, Shareholder proposals in the new 
millennium: Shareholder support, board response, and market reaction, (2007) 13 J. 
Corp. Fin. 368, 388 (“Increased shareholder voting support is positively 
correlated with board action on the resolution”); Mira Ganor, Why Do Managers 
Dismantle Staggered Boards, 33 Del. J. Corp. L. 149, 152 (2008) (finding “a 
statistically significant connection betwen precatory resolutions and the 
management's decision to destagger”); Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri, Stephen R. 
Stubben, Board of directors' responsiveness to shareholders: Evidence from shareholder 
proposals, (2010) 16 J. Corp. Fin. 53, 62 (“there is a significantly positive 
association between the likelihood of implementation and the percentage of ‘Votes 
For’.”); Luc Renneboog & Peter G. Szilagyi, The role of shareholder proposals in 
corporate governance, (2011) 17 J. Corp. Fin. 167, 181 (“the higher the percentage 
votes cast in favor, the higher the probability that a resolution is adopted”). I am 
also grateful to Ryan Bubb for discussions of his work on this topic. 
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that mutual funds believe that directors should consider the preferences of 
their shareholders. If that weren’t the case, voting on resolutions, and voting 
to withhold from unresponsive directors, would be a waste of the mutual 
fund’s resources. That mutual fund directors believe that portfolio 
company directors, as fiduciaries for their investors, should consider the 
preference of those investors, would seem to be consistent with the view 
that those mutual fund directors should consider the views of their own 
investors. 
Courts have also expressed views on the general question of directors 
taking into account the preferences of shareholders, and the specific 
question of mutual funds voting on shareholder resolutions. Delaware 
courts have generally suggested that corporate directors are not required to 
consider the preferences of their shareholders.33 However, such suggestions 
have generally come in the context of whether directors could take actions 
that they had reason to believe shareholders might disagree with.34 Federal 
courts have affirmed the importance of shareholder preferences on social 
and environmental matters as expressed in shareholder resolutions under 
Rule 14a-8, and indicated that corporate managers should not replace the 
preferences of their shareholders on such matters with managers’ own 
preferences,35 and that taking into account shareholder preferences on such 
                                                                                                                                          
33 See, e.g., the decision of then-Vice Chancellor Strine in In re Lear Corp. 
S'holder Litig., 967 A.2d 640, 655 (Del.Ch. 2008) (“Directors are not 
thermometers, existing to register the ever-changing sentiments of stockholders. 
… [D]irectors may take good faith actions that they believe will benefit 
stockholders, even if they realize that the stockholders do not agree with them.”) 
The decision also cited language that “a corporation is not a New England town 
meeting; directors, not shareholders, have responsibilities to manage the business 
and affairs of the corporation, subject however to a fiduciary obligation.” See TW 
Services, Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., 1989 WL 20290, at 8 n. 14 (Del. Ch. 1989).) 
34 For instance, Vice Chancellor Strine’s decision in In re Lear Corp. S'holder 
Litig. (ibid.) related to whether directors could put forward a merger agreement for 
stockholder approval if they believe that stockholders would benefit from its 
adoption, even if they had some reason to believe that stockholders may prefer not 
to approve it. 
35 See, e.g., Medical C'ttee for Human Rights v. Sec. and Exchange Comm., 432 
F.2d 659, 681 (D.C.Cir. 1970) (regarding whether the Dow Chemical Corporation 
could exclude a shareholder resolution requesting that directors consider ceasing 
production of napalm)(“It could scarcely be argued that management is more 
qualified or more entitled to make these kinds of decisions than the shareholders 
who are the true beneficial owners of the corporation; and it seems equally 
Social Responsibility Resolutions 
22 
matters does not conflict with managers’ need to apply its day-to-day 
business judgment.36 In considering whether there is any conflict between 
these positions, it should be noted that hundreds of Delaware corporations 
have taken actions initially opposed by directors in response to successful 
shareholder resolutions, without any challenge claiming such actions were 
in breach of those directors’ fiduciary duties. 
III. Undistorting Social Responsibility 
Resolutions 
Distortions in mutual fund voting may occur if the way mutual funds 
vote does not match the preferences of mutual fund investors. If such 
distortion is taking place, and is considered to be a problem, this definition 
suggests two kinds of solutions: mutual fund investors could choose mutual 
funds that vote the way they prefer, or mutual funds can change the way 
they vote to match their investors’ preferences. 
A. Investor Sorting by Mutual Fund Voting Policy 
One solution is for investors to choose funds whose voting policies 
match their preferences, and for current investors in funds whose voting 
policies do not match their preferences to switch to another mutual fund.37 
To a limited extent, such sorting already occurs. Some mutual funds 
families, such as Calvert, are ‘socially responsible investment’ (SRI) funds  
                                                                                                                                          
implausible that an application of the proxy rules which permitted such a result 
could be harmonized with the philosophy of corporate democracy which Congress 
embodied in section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.”) 
36 Medical C'ttee for Human Rights v. Sec. and Exchange Comm., ibid., (“… 
there is a clear and compelling distinction between management's legitimate need 
for freedom to apply its expertise in matters of day-to-day business judgment, and 
management's patently illegitimate claim of power to treat modern corporations 
with their vast resources as personal satrapies implementing personal political or 
moral predilections.”) 
37 I do not consider the possibility that mutual fund investors whose preferences 
do not match the voting policy of their mutual fund should change their 
preferences to match that voting policy. This suggests that investors would accept 
that the mutual fund understands what is best for them better than they do 
themselves. This would be plausible if they do not have preferences on a matter, 
but not if they have preferences that they developed independently of the mutual 
fund’s position on the matter.  
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– they choose investments and vote their proxies in a way that they believe 
serves social purposes, as well as maximizing returns or minimizing risk. 
Other fund families that are not SRI funds may have one or more fund 
families that are SRI funds – for instance, TIAA’s Social Choice Equity 
Fund. SRI funds make up a growing proportion of the overall mutual fund 
market. According to a report released by the U.S. S.I.F. Foundation, in 
2014 there were 480 registered investment companies (including mutual 
funds, variable annuities, exchange-traded funds and closed-end funds), 
which collectively managed $1.9 trillion in assets.  This reflects an ongoing 
movement of investors towards these funds. A significant amount of this 
investment may come from pension funds and non-profits. However, the 
value of investments in these funds is still dwarfed by that in traditional 
funds. If, as Part II suggests, a significant number of mutual fund investors 
have preferences that are closer to the voting policies of SRI funds than 
those of traditional investment advisers, why don’t more of those investors 
choose to switch their investments from funds that do not vote as they 
would prefer to funds that do? And why do new investors choose funds that 
vote other than as they would prefer?38 That is, why is this problem not 
solved by the mutual fund equivalent of the ‘Wall Street Walk,’ a kind of 
‘Main Street Walk’? There are several potential reasons.  
1. Informational problems. Investors in mainstream mutual funds are 
likely to be unaware of the way their funds vote, and that those votes may 
not be consistent with their own preferences.  
Mutual funds disclose their voting policies, usually on their own 
websites; however, these policies are difficult to compare and interpret. 
Comparing voting policies among multiple funds requires considerable 
effort. There is no central repository for voting policies from different fund 
families. Policies are structured and worded very differently, making side-
by-side comparisons difficult. Policies are often vague; on many matters 
they indicate simply that the fund will vote on a case-by-case basis. 
Similarly, it is difficult for investors to get useful information about fund 
voting records. Although each fund discloses its votes for the past year on 
Form N-PX, the forms include every single resolution voted on at every 
                                                                                                                                          
38 This section will focus on the existing investor aspect of the question, but will 
apply the reasoning to new investors in Section A.4. 
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single company in which the fund invests, so can be incredibly lengthy.39 
Form N-PX provides no aggregation of voting by fund family or resolution 
type of the kind presented in Part II, and it is unrealistic to expect individual 
investors to perform such analysis. A number of non-profit organizations 
that advocate on various issues consider mutual fund votes on the particular 
issue of that interest them.40 However, there is currently no way for mutual 
fund investors to gain a comprehensive view of the voting of the mutual 
funds in which they invest or may wish to invest. 
Reducing this information problem is possible, and may allow additional 
sorting. For instance, the website proxydemocracy.org contains voting data 
for a number of mutual funds on many social and environmental resolutions, 
scraped from their Forms N-PX.41  However, while the site contains 
comprehensive data from 2003 to 2010, data since that time is limited to 
that provided by a small number of mutual funds that voluntarily provided 
it to the site,42 because of resource constraints in gathering Forms N-PX on 
an annual basis and administering the site. This demonstrates the collective 
action nature of the information gathering problem – even though doing so 
would be of value, the benefits are divided among very widely dispersed 
mutual fund investors, each of whom may value the information only very 
slightly, and insufficiently to pay for the costs of supplying that benefit and 
the transaction costs of gathering the payment. This could be overcome by 
the intervention of a non-profit organization, for instance one that that aims 
to assist investors, or that aims to improve the choices of companies on some 
of the social responsibility resolutions that would be more successful if 
                                                                                                                                          
39 The Form N-PX filed by the Vanguard Total Stock Market Index Fund for the 
year ended June 30, 2014 is over 400 pages long. 
40 For instance, the Center for Political Accountability produced annual reports 
on mutual fund voting on political spending resolutions. See, e.g., Center for 
Political Accountability, Corporate Political Spending and the 
Mutual Fund Vote, November 2014, available at http://perma.cc/2EVZ-
R4XT.  
41 See Andy Eggers, “Alpha Version of our mutual fund vote database”, July 24, 
2007, available at https://perma.cc/S8M5-XP4A. 
42 See Proxy Democracy, “About… Data” available at https://perma.cc/SUM4-
SSRR. 
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corporations voted as their investors preferred.43 It is possible that mutual 
funds that believe that their voting policies compare favorably to their peers 
may also be prepared to fund the collection and dissemination of such data, 
as it would provide them with a marketing advantage.44 
2. Insufficient options. Mutual fund voting policies represent a ‘bundle’ 
of voting preferences on different topics. Most funds in a fund family share 
the same voting policies, so the number of bundles is limited by the number 
of mutual fund families. It is therefore unlikely that every investor will be 
able to find a bundle that perfectly matches their own preferences. This is 
even more likely to be the case for investors that invest in mutual funds 
through defined contribution plans, which are limited to a number of plan 
choices chosen by the plan sponsor. Their options are even less likely to 
include a fund whose voting matches their preferences. 
3. Switching costs. Even if a fund with a sufficiently matching bundle 
exists, there are likely to be costs associated for an investor to switch to it. 
Most obviously, there may be commissions on trades in mutual fund shares. 
Many mutual funds also charge penalties to discourage excess trading, 
which take effect if the fund is sold before a certain period has elapsed.45 
Switching costs will include the information costs of finding the fund that 
sufficiently matches the preferences of the investor, and the burden of 
comparing the fund on a diverse set of attributes. There may also be 
behavioral obstacles to switching funds – Madrian and Shea observe a strong 
‘inertia’ effect in employee 401(k) behavior.46 This may be exacerbated by 
the significant amounts of information that it is necessary to process in order 
to make an optimal decision.  
Even if the costs associated with switching are not significant, they may 
dominate the interest of the investor in switching. The extent to which a 
rational investor cares about the way their mutual fund votes on a resolution 
                                                                                                                                          
43 Indeed, there are signs that this may already be taking place. For instance, the 
Sustainable Endowments Institute, a project of public charity Rockefeller 
Philanthropy Advisors, has taken over the running of proxydemocracy.org. 
44 This is a limited version of the argument further developed in Section B below.  
45 In 2005, the SEC implemented a rule to cap mutual fund redemption fees at 
2%. See SEC Final Rule: Mutual Fund Redemption Fees, March 11, 2005, 17 C.F.R. 
Part 270, Release No. IC-26782. 
46 See Brigitte C. Madrian and Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 
401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, Q. J. Econ. 116.4 (2001). 
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at a particular corporation in which they hold a microscopic proportional 
interest is likely to be similarly tiny. Even when aggregated across all the 
issues at all the companies in which they are invested, the interests are likely 
to still be very small, and to be dominated by switching costs, unless the 
investor abides by very strong views on environmental and social matters. 
However, even for other investors that care just a very small amount, these 
preferences are not zero. When aggregated across the very large numbers of 
investors, the aggregate value of the preference may be substantial. 
4. New investors. Although this section has focused on reasons why the 
Main Street Walk may not be effective for existing investors in mutual 
funds, variations on the same arguments also apply to new investors. As 
discussed above, such investors may not have available to them a sufficiently 
variegated set of investment options that they can choose the right bundle. 
In addition, these investors will also be burdened by information costs in 
determining the mutual fund with the best bundle of policies. And their 
preferences on the fund’s social and environmental voting are likely to be 
dominated by the multiple other factors they are likely to consider in 
choosing a retirement savings vehicle. 
B. Voting According to Investor Preference 
The alternative solution to investor sorting is for mutual funds to change 
their voting policies to reflect the preferences of their investors. How should 
a mutual fund ascertain the aggregate preferences of its large number of 
investors? It would not be realistic for the fund to conduct a vote of its 
ultimate investors each time a resolution is put forward at each of the many 
companies it holds in its portfolio. Each poll would require costly 
preparation, distribution and counting of ballots. And given the infinitesimal 
proportional interest of each individual investor in each portfolio company, 
and the even smaller likelihood of influencing the outcome of such votes, it 
would not be worth any investor’s time to vote in such a poll.  
However, since so many types of resolutions are similar, having 
individual votes is not necessary. Instead, mutual funds could ascertain the 
general preferences of their investors for each particular category of 
resolution, in the same way funds currently have voting guidelines for 
different categories of resolution. Funds would also not need to poll all of 
their investors. Instead, they could use the kinds of sampling techniques 
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employed by political polling and market research organizations to derive 
accurate estimates (within percentage points) of voter or consumer 
preferences from a relatively small number of respondents.47 If this variation 
is randomly distributed across mutual funds, then the aggregate effect 
across all mutual fund investors in a corporation will be zero. If this kind of 
solution were to be adopted, economies of scale may lead to third parties 
collectively polling for multiple mutual funds.48  This is similar to the 
provision of proxy advisory services, and might be provided either by the 
same organizations, or by new entrants, such as firms with existing expertise 
in polling 
As discussed in Part II, if a mutual fund votes its shares all-or-nothing, 
some distortion is inevitable, against the minority preferences of investors. 
This could be alleviated by proportional voting: the mutual fund could split 
its vote, in the proportion that represents the fund’s best estimate of the 
preferences of their investors. That is, if a fund’s polling led it to believe 
that 70% of its investors, weighted by value of investment, would prefer the 
fund to vote in favor of a particular resolution and 30% would prefer the fund 
to vote against the resolution, then it would vote 70% of its shares in favor of 
the resolution, and 30% of its shares against the resolution. Such 
proportional voting is explicitly contemplated by the Department of Labor’s 
1994 Interpretive Bulletin.49 A very small number of mutual funds already 
                                                                                                                                          
47 For instance, the Bannon Communications and the SurveyUSA polls cited in 
Part II claim sampling error of 3.8% and 2.5%, respectively. See notes 26 and 27, 
supra. 
48 It is possible that a fund might attempt to bias a survey in the direction the fund 
considers optimal. This presupposes that a fund has a strong enough reason to 
influence the outcome of the survey to outweigh the risk of trying to do so; it is not 
clear that this would be the case. However, if this were seen as a likely possibility it 
would increase the importance of having surveys conducted by a reputable third 
party. If there were a significant concern about biased surveys, having a third party 
conduct the survey could become a differentiating factor among funds 
implementing proportional voting. 
49 See Interpretive Bulletin Relating to Written Statements of Investment Policy, 
including Proxy Voting Policy or Guidelines, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,860, 29 C.F.R. 
2509.94-2 (July 29, 1994), at 366 (“An investment manager of a pooled investment 
vehicle that holds assets of more than one employee benefit plan may be subject to 
a proxy voting policy of one plan that conflicts with the proxy voting policy of 
another plan. Compliance with ERISA §404(a)(1)(D) would require such 
investment manager to reconcile, insofar as possible, the conflicting policies … 
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split votes – 0.04% of funds reporting on Form N-PX in 2014 recorded split 
votes, making clear that such vote splitting is possible.50 Conversations with 
the representative of an investment adviser responsible for implementing 
the votes of a large mutual fund family confirmed that it would be relatively 
straightforward for that mutual fund family to split their vote on shareholder 
resolutions.51  
If voting in accordance with investor preferences – either all-or-nothing 
or proportionally – were considered a desirable solution, how might it be 
achieved? A regulatory solution, through the SEC (applicable to all mutual 
funds) or the Department of Labor (applicable to investment advisers and 
other fiduciaries of ERISA pension plans), could require consideration of 
investor preferences in voting. A judicial reinterpretation of fiduciary duties 
of mutual funds or investment advisers could also require mutual fund 
directors or investment advisers to consider of what investors consider to 
be in their own best interests. However, some kind of regulatory or judicial 
‘deus ex machina’ solution may not be necessary. Instead, it is possible that 
voting in accordance with investor preferences may come about without 
regulatory or judicial intervention (or that regulation might instead follow a 
market trend towards proportional voting). 
Mutual funds might adopt proportional voting as a defense to pressure 
from public advocacy organization to vote in a particular way. If the 
information problem discussed in Section A.1 were to be solved, non-profit 
groups that advocate the implementation of certain environmental and 
social policies by corporations, including those that regularly submit 
shareholder resolutions on such topics, could use the data identify mutual 
funds that vote against their investors’ likely preferences. Such advocacy 
organizations could make the distortion clear to that mutual fund’s 
investors within the organizations’ own networks, and to other investors or 
potential investors in that fund with similar views, and suggest that investors 
consider switching to a fund that votes in the manner the advocacy 
                                                                                                                                          
and, if necessary and to the extent permitted by applicable law, vote the relevant 
proxies to reflect such policies in proportion to each plan’s interest in the pooled 
investment vehicle.”) 
50 As discussed in note 17, supra, only 0.04% of fund-votes in 2014 were split 
votes. 
51 Email correspondence with a representative of a large mutual fund, May 5, 
2016, on file with the author. 
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organization prefers. Indeed, some precursors of this kind of campaign are 
already being undertaken by certain advocacy organizations. For instance, a 
group of advocacy organizations have recently begun a campaign to pressure 
Vanguard to change its policy of voting against or abstaining on resolutions 
relating to disclosure of political spending.52 If these campaigns were to 
become more common and more successful, a fund may start voting in the 
manner advocated by the organizations. However, to the extent the fund 
votes all-or-nothing, there will still be a minority of investors whose 
preferences the fund is voting against. To avoid this, a fund could adopt a 
proportional voting policy. Adopting proportional voting could be done 
preemptively, to prevent or deter such campaigns by advocacy 
organizations, or defensively, in response to an explicit request by advocacy 
organizations for the fund to vote in a particular way. Either way, the 
explanation that the fund was voting in the interests of all of its investors 
would provide an irreproachable answer to such advocacy. 
If one mutual fund were to adopt proportional voting, whether in 
response to outside pressure or of its own volition, it could then market itself 
as better aligned with the preferences of investors than its competitors.53 As 
discussed in Section A, there are various reasons why many investors may be 
unlikely to switch between mutual funds. However, there are likely to be 
some marginal investors who have particularly strong preferences on issues 
on which there may be sufficient distortion that they might consider 
switching. Pension funds that employ investment advisers could also use 
their purchasing power to pressure investment advisers to adopt 
proportional voting, not just for those pension funds’ investments, but for 
all the adviser’s mutual fund products. At that point, proportional voting 
could become an effective defensive measure for investment advisers and 
mutual fund families. Because proportional voting would largely involve 
                                                                                                                                          
52 See, e.g., Eleanor Bloxham, Corporate Political Donations and Lobbying are Still 
Trapped in a Murky, Dark Cloud, Fortune.com, Mar. 7, 2016, available at 
https://perma.cc/5JVE-R5W6 (“over 65,000 members of Public Citizen, U.S. 
PIRG, and Common Cause, among others, sent emails to Vanguard asking it to 
change its voting policy guidelines to vote in favor of political spending 
disclosure”). 
53 For instance, SRI funds could easily start adopting a proportional voting 
mechanism, and marketing it to potential investors – most likely ultimate investors 
with strong social preferences, but possibly a broader group.  
Social Responsibility Resolutions 
30 
fixed costs (establishing a polling infrastructure or paying an outside advisor 
to undertake polling), for large mutual funds the per-investor cost of 
implementing proportional voting would be very small. Given the breadth 
of their investors, and the likely divergence of views amongst them, large 
mutual funds may also benefit more from being able to represent the views 
of all of their investors than smaller, more homogeneous funds. Since they 
would no longer be taking voting positions that diverged from the majority 
preferences, of their investors or even the minority preferences, their votes 
would be defensible to all of their investors. 
Long term demographic changes may strengthen the likelihood of a 
move to voting according to investor preferences. Younger investors 
entering the market for mutual fund products as they find employment and 
start saving for retirement are likely to be more socially engaged than older 
investors, and may be more likely to weigh their preferences on social and 
environmental matters in making investment decisions, and the proportion 
of the market represented by such investors represent will only increase.  
C. The Impact of Undistorted Social Responsibility Resolutions 
If steps were taken to reduce distortion in mutual fund voting, this may 
have significant flow-on effects. As described in Part II, Because many 
mutual funds currently vote against or abstain on shareholder resolutions 
that a majority of their investors are likely to support, many resolutions 
receive aggregate support substantially less than a majority of votes cast, 
even though a majority of the ultimate investors of those corporations would 
prefer that those resolutions pass. Were mutual funds to vote consistently 
with the majority preferences of their investors, or proportionately with the 
preferences of all of their investors, aggregate levels of support would 
increase substantially, and many resolutions that currently receive less than 
50% support would pass. Empirical evidence suggests that moves by certain 
mutual funds to change their voting policy on certain shareholder 
resolutions may influence their peer mutual funds to similarly change their 
own policies.54 
                                                                                                                                          
54 Matvos & Ostrovsky found that a fund is more likely to oppose management 
when other funds are more likely to oppose it as well. See Matvos & Ostrovsky, 
Heterogeneity and peer effects in mutual fund proxy voting, supra note 19, at 91. 
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Increased passage of shareholder resolutions is likely to result in 
increased implementation of the measures requested. Shareholder 
resolutions are generally precatory, so directors of corporations where a 
resolution passes may choose whether or not to implement the resolutions. 
However, as discussed above, if a resolution passes, the company is more 
likely to implement the action requested.55 In the same way that mutual 
funds may choose to consider the views of their investors in determining 
their voting policy, directors may be influenced to follow the preferences of 
shareholders expressed through the vote. Because of other mutual fund 
voting policies, and the policies of proxy advisory firms, directors that do 
not implement shareholder resolutions that receive majority support may 
have votes withheld from their own elections in subsequent years, which 
may impact directors’ decisions to implement resolutions.56 A corporation 
may be more likely to implement a requested action even if the resolution 
did not pass, but received strong minority support, e.g., more than 40% of 
votes cast. Many social responsibility resolutions that corporations believe 
are likely to receive strong support result in negotiated agreements to 
implement some measures requested in the resolution.57 Increasing the level 
of voting support for these resolutions would mean that they are more likely 
to result in negotiated agreements. 
Reducing distortion and increasing the level of support for shareholder 
resolutions is likely to have a dynamic effect on the number and type of 
shareholder resolutions submitted. Proponents are more likely to submit 
resolutions that are likely to receive greater support. Proponents that are 
currently seeking change through other forms of action may devote more 
resources to submitting shareholder resolutions if those resolutions become 
more effective as a way to persuade corporations to make desired changes. 
                                                                                                                                          
55 See note 32, supra. 
56 See, e.g., Laurent Bach & Daniel Metzger, Why Do Shareholder Votes Matter?, 
Swedish House of Finance Research Paper No. 13-01, August 2105 (available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2247084), 2 (“If support for a resolution barely passes 
50% of votes cast ‘for’ and ‘against’ (the CII threshold) and yet management does 
not implement the resolution, then the number of votes against incumbent 
directors in the next election increases significantly.”) 
57 For a discussion of settlements of resolutions relating to political spending, see 
Sarah C. Haan, Shareholder Proposal Settelments and the Private Ordering of Public 
Elections, 125 Yale L.J. (2016), forthcoming, available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2780592. 
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This is likely to result not only in more of the types of resolutions that start 
to receive greater support, but also the submission of new types of 
resolutions, on topics which – even though they reflect the preferences of 
investors – may not receive much support based on the current voting 
policies of mutual funds. One potential limitation on submitting new types 
of shareholder resolutions may be SEC rules allowing exclusion of 
shareholder resolutions submitted pursuant to Rule 14a-8 that relate to the 
ordinary business of the corporation.58 However, since 1970, the SEC has 
allowed shareholder resolutions on environmental and social matters that it 
considered of sufficient social importance.59 That resolutions are likely to 
receive greater support may be evidence that investors consider them to be 
important. 
The above scenario represents private ordering by corporations on 
issues of social and environmental importance, initiated by shareholder 
resolutions and supported by mutual funds and other institutional investors 
voting in a manner guided by investor preferences. On many social and 
environmental matters that are put to shareholders for a vote, it may be 
preferable for rules to be set for the industry or economy as a whole, by 
legislation, regulation or judicial action. For instance, on political spending, 
legislation or regulation requiring disclosure of political spending may be 
preferable to policies that apply at individual companies. It is clearly the case 
that, with respect to many problems, company private ordering will be 
inferior to mandatory rules. Where a policy should apply across a large 
group of companies, implementing it one company at a time will be 
duplicative and expensive. There may be ‘first-mover’ disadvantages 
whereby particular companies that adopt the rule before other companies 
suffer disproportional costs. There may also be distortions from public 
corporations becoming subject to rules through private ordering that 
privately held corporations and other types of business entity are not subject 
to. In addition, because the distribution of popular ownership of 
corporations over-represents wealthier and higher income households, 
                                                                                                                                          
58 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8(i)(7). For a comprehensive discussion the SEC’s ordinary 
business exclusion, see Reilly S. Steel, The Underground Rulification of the Ordinary 
Business Operations Exclusion (Mar. 23, 2016), 116 Colum. L. Rev. (2016), 
forthcoming. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2752591. 
59 Medical C'ttee for Human Rights v. Sec. and Exchange Comm., supra note 35. 
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decisions made through shareholder voting may be less reflective of social 
welfare than decisions made through more broadly democratic bodies, and 
therefore likely to be only a second-best solution. However, corporate 
private ordering would not be necessary if there were legislative or 
regulatory action on these matters. Where there is no such action, the 
second-best solution may be the best available solution. 
The greater submission and success of shareholder resolutions, and the 
implementation of shareholder-proposed changes by corporations, may also 
inform the views of regulators, legislators and jurists on those matters. That 
more resolutions succeed makes clear that investors prefer the changes 
proposed, and the implementation of proposed changes makes clear that 
directors of corporations may also agree that those actions are in the best 
interests of the corporation. Implementation also allows other corporations 
and commentators to see that proposed actions can be made without certain 
potential negative effects that they might fear. As a result, successful 
resolutions can lead to broader adoption, and in some cases, to regulation. 
To a significant extent, the strong support for shareholder resolutions 
requesting ‘say-on-pay’ votes, and the success of those resolutions in 
persuading corporations to adopt say-on-pay votes, paved the way for the 
mandatory say-on-pay rules included in the Dodd-Frank Act.60  
 Conclusion 
This article began by considering the relationship between voting by 
institutional investors on social responsibility resolutions, and the interests 
and preferences of their own investors on social and environmental matters. 
Evidence from mutual fund voting on social responsibility resolutions raises 
several questions. 
First, why do mutual funds with similar investors, and identical 
fiduciary duties, vote very differently on social responsibility resolutions? 
This suggests that at some mutual funds are not voting in the best interests 
of their investors.  
Second, is there a distortion between how mutual funds vote, and what 
their investors would prefer? The data this article uses for investor 
                                                                                                                                          
60 The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, 
§951, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2010). 
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preferences is necessarily limited and imperfect; as an initial step to 
examining some of these questions, mutual funds – with the encouragement 
of the SEC – should undertake their own analyses to determine the 
preferences of their investors, and whether there is indeed a distortion 
between those preferences and their own voting policies. 
Third, is distortion between mutual fund votes and investors 
preferences undesirable? Indeed, should mutual funds consider the 
preferences of their investors at all? The article considers both sides of this 
question, and does not attempt to reach a conclusion, although it suggests 
some reasons why considering investor preferences is more consistent with 
the existing proxy voting system. 
Finally, if distortions in mutual fund voting are undesirable, how might 
they be eliminated? A prerequisite for eliminating distortion is information 
about mutual fund voting that would allow investors, potential investors, 
mutual funds and third parties to compare the voting records of different 
mutual fund families. Having such information available may increase the 
possibility of investor selection based on preferences, but this is, at best, a 
partial solution. More effective would be changes in mutual fund voting to 
reflect investor preferences, such as proportional voting.  
The stakes for these questions are high: changing mutual fund voting on 
social responsibility resolutions could significantly influence corporate 
behavior on social and environmental matters in a way that investors, and 
society, would prefer.  
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Appendix: Social Responsibility Resolution 
Voting and Poll Data 
Table A.1: Mutual Family Fund Voting on Political Spending Resolutions, 
2014 
  . Fund Families, by For / Ag. For / Ag.    . Fund Families, by Size For / Ag. 
 1. Deutsche (Fund-votes: 278) 100 /  0   1. Vanguard (Fund-votes: 1,028)   0 / 36 
 2. MFS (238)  95 /  5   2. Fidelity (1,075)   6 / 11 
 3. SEI (392)  86 / 14   3. Capital Group (175)   3 / 97 
 4. Mainstay (126)  85 / 15   4. BlackRock (1,257)   1 / 98 
 5. Morgan Stanley (114)  83 / 17   5. T Rowe Price (457)   2 / 98 
 6. Wells Fargo (225)  83 / 17   6. JPMorgan (392)   3 / 97 
 7. Columbia Funds (318)  58 / 42   7. State Street  (396)  39 / 32 
 8. John Hancock (401)  56 / 42   8. Allianz (306)  38 / 62 
 9. Charles Schwab (438)  55 / 45   9. Columbia Funds (318)  58 / 42 
10. Legg Mason (136)  51 / 49  10. Dimensional (368)   0 /100 
11. Janus (194)  44 /  6  11. Goldman Sachs (165)  18 / 75 
12. State Street  (396)  39 / 32  12. Federated Investors (102)  15 / 85 
13. Allianz (306)  38 / 62  13. Dreyfus (170)   0 /100 
14. AXA (727)  37 / 60  14. Wells Fargo (225)  83 / 17 
15. TIAA (494)  36 / 62  15. Invesco Funds (547)  36 / 61 
16. Invesco Funds (547)  36 / 61  16. MFS (238)  95 /  5 
17. Prudential (525)  19 / 50  17. Charles Schwab (438)  55 / 45 
18. Goldman Sachs (165)  18 / 75  18. John Hancock (401)  56 / 42 
19. Northern Trust (108)  15 / 85  19. Prudential (525)  19 / 50 
20. Federated Investors (102)  15 / 85  20. Jackson National (235)   5 / 95 
21. Fidelity (1,075)   6 / 11  21. Morgan Stanley (114)  83 / 17 
22. Jackson National (235)   5 / 95  22. Legg Mason (136)  51 / 49 
23. Capital Group (175)   3 / 97  23. Northern Trust (108)  15 / 85 
24. JPMorgan (392)   3 / 97  24. AXA (727)  37 / 60 
25. T Rowe Price (457)   2 / 98  25. TIAA (494)  36 / 62 
26. BlackRock (1,257)   1 / 98  26. Mainstay (126)  85 / 15 
27. Vanguard (1,028)   0 / 36 27. SEI (392)  86 / 14 
28. Dimensional (368)   0 /100 28. Deutsche (278) 100 /  0 
28. Dreyfus (170)   0 /100 29. Putnam (331)   0 /100 
28. Putnam (331)   0 /100 30. Janus (194)  44 /  6 
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Table A.2: Selected Results from Bannon Communications Poll, 2010 
 “Please tell me whether you STRONGLY FAVOR, FAVOR, OPPOSE, or 
STRONGLY OPPOSE each of the following resolutions [Rotate Order].” 
… “(B) A requirement that shareholders in a company approve all corporate political 











All 71% 23%  6% 40%  8% 
Female <35 74% 21%  4% 34%  5% 
Female 35-55 77% 19%  5% 44%  9% 
Female 55 + 73% 18%  9% 46%  6% 
Male 35 69% 27%  4% 36%  6% 
Male 35-55 68% 28%  4% 34% 16% 
Male 55 + 67% 25%  8% 42%  8% 
… “(D) A requirement that companies must publicly disclose political expenditures to 












All 77% 18%  6% 45%  7% 
Female <35 70% 22%  8% 33%  7% 
Female 35-55 84% 11%  5% 53%  5% 
Female 55 + 79% 15%  6% 44%  6% 
Male 35 76% 22%  3% 46%  9% 
Male 35-55 76% 19%  5% 47%  8% 
Male 55 + 73% 20% 6% 46%  8% 
 
  




Table A.3: Selected Results from SurveyUSA Poll, 2010 
“Should a publicly traded corporation get shareholder approval before the corporation 
spends money to support or oppose a candidate for elected office? Or, is shareholder 
approval not necessary? [Answer Choices Rotated]” 
 Should Get Approval Not Necessary Not sure 
All 75% 13% 12% 
Male 72% 15% 13% 
Female 78% 12% 10% 
18-34 70% 11% 20% 
35-49 71% 18% 10% 
50-64 83% 12%  5% 
65+ 79% 12%  8% 
18-49 70% 14% 15% 
50+ 81% 12%  6% 
Republican 79% 14%  7% 
Democrat 74% 11% 15% 
Independent 75% 15% 11% 
Income <$50,000 70% 12% 18% 
Income >$50,000 81% 14%  5% 
Northeast 63% 17% 20% 
Midwest 78% 13%  9% 
South 79% 13%  8% 
West 76% 11% 13% 
 
